Organization (WHO) declared a phase-6 pandemic alert, indicating a global pandemic. The earliest virus isolates were sensitive to the neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) zanamivir and oseltamivir, but resistant to M2 inhibitors, such as amantadine and rimantadine (1, [3] [4] [5] . Thus, the NAIs have been used globally for treatment and prophylaxis of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infl ection.
Oseltamivir-resistant (OR) pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was fi rst detected in Japan, Denmark, and Hong Kong during May-June 2009 and has since been sporadically identifi ed around the world (6) (7) (8) . The OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses have a specifi c NA mutation, a histidine-to-tyrosine substitution at amino acid position 275 (N1 numbering, H275Y), that confers resistance to oseltamivir. In a report of 39 OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases (as of October 22, 2009 ), 16 were associated with treatment, 13 were associated with postexposure prophylaxis, 3 were in NAIuntreated patients, and 7 were of unknown association (8) . Preliminary global NAI surveillance showed 190 OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infections among >15,000 clinical specimens; thus, the global frequency of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was <1.5% (as of January 8, 2010) (9) . These reports indicated that human-to-human transmission of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was limited but that oseltamivir treatment and prophylaxis could lead to emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
A report for [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] showed that Japan accounted for ≈70% of the world's oseltamivir consumption (10) . oseltamivir were supplied in Japan, ≈2.3× that of the 2008-09 seasons (data from Chugai Co. Ltd, Tokyo, Japan). Thus, Japan is a high-risk environment for the development of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus because of drug use pressure. The emergence of such resistance is alarming, because OR seasonal infl uenza A (H1N1) viruses can rapidly spread worldwide once they acquire the capacity for human-to-human transmission (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Materials and Methods

Virus Testing
Infl uenza sentinel clinics and nonsentinel institutes send original samples to local public health laboratories for detection and virus isolation. In total, 4,307 clinical specimens, comprising both original samples (n = 440) and clinical isolates (n = 3,867), underwent either full or partial (nt 695-1110) NA sequencing to detect the H275Y mutation. Samples from 1,088 cases were collected before oseltamivir exposure, 516 were associated with oseltamivir use, 103 were associated with zanamivir use, and for 2,600, antivirual treatment status was unknown. We collected all OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates and randomly selected OS isolates (≈10%) from local public health laboratories. These representative OS and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates underwent NA inhibition assay (421 OS and 61 OR viruses tested), full NA and hemagglutination (HA) sequencing (190 OS and 61 OR), internal gene (PB2/PB1/PA/NP/M/NS) sequencing (138 OS and 20 OR), and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test (583 OS and 59 OR).
Sequence Analysis
Phylogenetic trees of NA and HA genes were constructed by neighbor-joining method. A phylogenetic tree was constructed by using representative OR and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates from several prefectures of Japan. Sequence information of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from other countries was downloaded from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Infl uenza Data (GISAID) and GenBank. All amino acid positions in the phylogenetic tree were described by N1 numbering.
NAI Assay
A chemiluminescent NAI assay was performed with the NA-star kit (Applied Biosystems, Tokyo, Japan) (13) . Briefl y, fi nal drug concentration was 0.03-6,500
Emerging The sentinel clinics, consisting of 3,000 pediatric clinics and 2,000 internal medical clinics, collected samples randomly, while the nonsentinel clinics collected samples depending on the surveillance stage. Local public health laboratories randomly selected these samples for neuraminidase (NA) surveillance from both sentinel and nonsentinel clinics. In this study, 4,307 clinical specimens, comprising both original samples (n = 440) and isolates (n = 3,867), were subjected to full or partial NA sequencing for detection of the H275Y mutation. All oseltamivir-resistant (n = 61) and ≈10% of oseltamivir-susceptible pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 421) isolates were then subjected to NA assay. The treatment history of the 4,307 cases consists of NA inhibitor-untreated (n = 1,088), oseltamivir use (n = 516), zanamivir use (n = 103), and unknown history (n = 2,600 
Statistical Analyses
Box-and-whisker plots were used to determine the cutoff value between NAI-resistant (outlier) and -sensitive viruses. The box contains 50% of the results, representing the middle 2 quartiles (25%-75%). The length of the box shows the interquartile range (IQR). The cutoff value was defi ned as the upper quartile + 3.0 × interquartile range from the 25th to 75th percentile. For statistical analyses, OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses with the H275Y mutation were excluded from the overall population.
HI Test
An HI test was performed to evaluate the reactivity of ferret antiserum against the 2009/10 vaccine strain A/ California/7/2009, as described in the WHO Manual (17) . The effi cacy of ferret postinfection antiserum against egg-grown A/California/7/2009 was used as a reference. Antiserum was treated with receptor-destroying enzyme II (Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan) and adsorbed with turkey erythrocytes before testing, to prevent nonspecifi c reactions. A 0.5% suspension of turkey erythrocytes was used for the HI test.
Results
Geographic Distribution of OR Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
The 4 (Table 1) .
Of the 61 case-patients, 36 (59%) were male; 19 (31%) were 0-4 years, 25 (41%) were 5-18 years, 12 (20%) were 19-50 years, and 5 (8%) were >50 years. Underlying medical conditions were known for 41; 24 had chronic underlying medical conditions (pulmonary [13] , neurologic [4] , blood [3] , diabetes [1], kidney disease [1], immunocompromised [5] , other conditions [2] ).
Two Possible Cases of Human-to-Human Virus Transmission
Almost all OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases emerged sporadically and were not epidemiologically linked. However, 2 cases of human-to-human transmission were suspected. One was observed in Niigata Prefecture where 2 children hospitalized in the same room were infected with OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus within a few days. Symptoms developed fi rst in a 4-year-old girl on October 10, *Of total 4,307 specimens tested, neuraminidase inhibitor treatment history was available for 1,707; of these specimens, 516 were from patients who had received oseltamivir treatment. †Parentheses indicate prophylactic use, e.g., 4 (1) = 1 of 4 total uses was for prophylaxis. ‡Day 0 represents the samples collected within 24 h after oseltamivir use. Figure, www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/3/470-appF.htm). Because calculating precise IC 50 values from a mixed population of NAI-resistant and -sensitive viruses is not possible (13, 18) , the 13 mixed isolates were excluded from the overall population for the purposes of the statistical analysis of OR.
Antiviral Drug Susceptibility
NAI data are summarized in Table 3 (Table 3) .
Susceptibility to M2 inhibitors was determined by M2 sequencing. All tested viruses, including OR (n = 20) and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 138), had an S31N resistance marker in the M2 protein, suggesting that all pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates were resistant to M2 inhibitors.
Antigenic Characterization
The HI test was performed to estimate the reactivity of OS (n = 583) and OR pandemic (H1N1) In this study, clinical specimens were collected from both NAI-untreated and NAI-treated patients, so later samples were collected after the exertion of selective pressure by drug treatment. However, frequency of detection of OR pandemic ( (19) .
Early reports suggested that ≈70% of the worldwide consumption of oseltamivir occurs in Japan (10), but long-term NAI surveillance in Japan from 1996 to 2007 (10) and previous NAI surveillance (16, 20, 21) showed a low frequency of resistant viruses, suggesting that the transmissibility of OR viruses selected by drug pressure was remarkably reduced. However, beginning in November 2007, an unexpectedly high frequency of OR seasonal infl uenza A (H1N1) viruses with the H275Y mutation was detected in Europe (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) . Most were isolated from NAIuntreated patients and were more transmissible than OS infl uenza A (H1N1), resulting in rapid global dissemination (15) . In contrast, even in the 2007-08 season, OR infl uenza A (H1N1) was detected only rarely (1.5%-2.6%) in Japan, despite the high level of oseltamivir use (13, 22) . However, OR infl uenza A (H1N1) virus was detected at a far higher frequency (≈100%) the next year (13) . Thus, the pattern of oseltamivir use did not correspond to the emergence and widespread distribution of OR infl uenza A (H1N1) viruses.
In contrast, this study and a recent report (8) In an NAI assay of zanamivir susceptibility, statistical analysis identifi ed 3 outliers. One OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 possessed the D151D/N mutation, which has been reported to affect susceptibility to zanamivir in seasonal viruses (20, 21) . Two OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates had the substitutions I34V and I195V in NA; however, whether these affect zanamivir susceptibility is unclear. We also assayed peramivir susceptibility in representative OR and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates. Data suggested that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, which contained the H275Y substitution, possessed cross-resistance to peramivir, as reported by another group (27) .
Both case reports and preliminary NAI surveillance (8, 19, (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) have indicated 2 groups are at high risk for the generation of resistant viruses. The fi rst is patients with severely compromised or suppressed immune systems, who shed virus for prolonged periods and thus have an increased chance of developing resistant virus (33, 34) . WHO reported that 25% of 285 resistant cases (as of April 17, 2010) occurred in immunocompromised patients (35) . The second group is persons who are receiving postexposure prophylaxis, who take a subtherapeutic dose of 75 mg 1×/day (treatment dosage is 75 mg 2×/day). This regimen may only partially inhibit viral replication, thus facilitating the emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009. WHO recommends chemoprophylaxis only for persons who have a higher risk for severe or complicated illness (19) . These groups were observed in our study.
We found that most OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in samples collected at least 4 days after oseltamivir treatment or prophylaxis (Table 1) . However, the frequency of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in each day of treatment with oseltamivir could not be calculated because of a lack of treatment history data. This timing is consistent with that for OR seasonal infl uenza A (H1N1, H3N2) and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, which typically emerge 3-6 days after oseltamivir treatment (36) (37) (38) . Additionally, we also observed the rapid emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus within 48 hours of oseltamivir exposure (39) . Nontheless, 6 cases occurred in untreated patients. Indeed, the OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the Oita case may likely be a natural occurrence. We are aware of only 2 other reports, one from Vietnam and one from Hong Kong, of naturally occurring OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in untreated patients (7, 40) .
The greatest concern regarding OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is that drug-resistant viruses will acquire the ability to be transmitted effi ciently among humans as has recent OR seasonal infl uenza A (H1N1). Two hospital outbreaks in the United Kingdom and the United States have been reported (31, 32) . In both, the immune systems of all patients were severely compromised or suppressed, indicating that these patients had an increased risk for not only the emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, but also OR seasonal infl uenza (H1N1) virus (31, 32) . In contrast, particular attention should be paid to the Vietnamese case because a naturally occurring OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus caused a cluster of 7 cases in immunocompetent patients with no history of oseltamivir use (40) .
Despite the high level of oseltamivir use in Japan, prevalence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 remains low (1.4%). Thus, oseltamivir remains the fi rst option for treating pandemic (H1N1) 2009, but zanamivir should be considered for immunocompromised patients. Additionally, as fi rst priority for prophylaxis of both OR and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection should be vaccination, but not antiviral agents. Conversely, a preclinical animal model showed that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had high potential to acquire transmissibility without losing viral fi tness (24) (25) (26) . Whether and how OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 may acquire effi cient transmissibility among humans are not known. Thus, vigilant monitoring of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection and alterations in its transmissibility and antigenic and genetic characteristics is essential.
